Hard vs. Soft Security

In discussing electronic locks with a security company the other day, what came to the fore was "hard" approaches vs. "soft" approaches. "Hard" approaches are those which stop a would-be intruder with brute force numbers: say, only one code in one-billion will open a lock. "Soft" approaches will consider how the would-be intruder would actually be stopped. I show an example here from my book -- a stupidly cheap and simple design ©. This uses a twelve-key keypad. Of those twelve keys, all but S1 and S2 are wired in parallel with S3. In practice then, S1 and S2 must be pressed together to open the lock. All the other keys delay progress. How many intruders would guess, firstly, that this uses a parallel code? There are no such locks on the market. And even if someone handed an intruder the design, it would take them an average three hours to open the lock. In fact with some very simple changes, one could extend that to a week. OBSERVATION: Take some other examples. A twist of a magnet opens a lock (with a keypad as a decoy), or a puff on a dog-whistle does it. The only problem I can see is if one's lock should become popular enough to be "reckoned with" by intruders.